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Abstract
This paper argues that the Rasch model, unlike the other models generally referred to
as IRT models, and those that fall into the tradition of True Score models, encompasses
a set of rigorous prescriptions for what scientific measurement would be like if it were
to be achieved in the social sciences. As a direct consequence, the Rasch measurement
approach to the construction and monitoring of variables is sensitive to the issues raised
in Messick’s (1995) broader conception of construct validity. The theory / practice dialec-
tic (Bond & Fox, 2001) ensures that validity is foremost in the mind of those developing
measures and that genuine scientific measurement is foremost in the minds of those who
seek valid outcomes from assessment. Failures of invariance, such as those referred to as
DIF, should alert researchers to the need to modify assessment procedures or the subs-
tantive theory under investigation, or both.
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Whose validity is more important?
"Yes, I think I do realize what you’re saying to me. You’re saying that item 17 on
the test is such an important question about the ability being tested that you can’t
possibly do away with it. However, what I’m trying to say you is, that, in spite of
your attempts so far, it is highly unlikely that the ability that the examinees use to
respond correctly to item 17 is the same sort of ability that underlies their success
on the other items in the test."
"How can you say that? The item was written by the same members of the exa-
miners board who wrote the other items; they think that item is crucial in terms of
the ability being tested. In fact, you can’t take it out without damaging the validity
of the test. We’re the examining board; item 17 has to stay."
"The problem, basically, is this. You intend to grade people on this test according
to the well used practice of summing the total scores. There’s nothing wrong with
that - in fact it’s a great idea, but success on item 17 does not contribute to that total
score in the same way as success on the other items does. Examinees who have high
scores on the other items sometimes fail on #17; some of the lowest ability children
are somehow getting this item right. At this stage item 17 is not communicating
what you want to test to the examinees sufficiently well that their responses to that
item should be counted in the test score over all. The safest thing for us to do at this
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stage is to omit this item from the total score. Then, we should seek out some of the
children who performed unexpectedly and to try to find out how your assessment
intentions went wrong. After that we can modify item 17 or we might write a new
item for inclusion in a further test."
"We’ve already included #17 in the test – we’re not going to throw the results
away just because you don’t seem to like them."
At least, in the case of educational testing, stories like this one are legion. The
team of content experts and the psychometrician go head to head on an important
testing issue. Often, it is face validity, as judged by the expert panel, that wins the
day - with the psychometrician walking out, mumbling, "Fine. Just don’t add the
scores together!"
The aim of this paper is to address issues of construct validity in psychological
and educational assessment from the perspective provided by Rasch measurement.
This, of course, focuses on only one small part of the sort of research routinely
carried out in the social sciences. While a considerable amount of this research takes
an unabashedly qualitative view point, the issues here pertain directly to those who
adopt a quantitative approach to their research in the human sciences. And, from
within that quantitative perspective, it addresses those who attend to the issue of the
measurement of human variables and, in particular, those who attempt to emulate
in their research some of those particular properties of measurement that abound
in the physical sciences.
The central role of measurement
The Rasch model, unlike the other models generally referred to as IRT models, and
those that fall into the tradition of True Score models, encompasses a set of rigorous
prescriptions for what scientific measurement would be like if it were to be achieved
in the social sciences. Those measurement prescriptions might be generally descri-
bed as a probabilistic form of the axiomatic conjoint measurement recommended to
us by a Duncan Luce et al. (Luce & Tukey, 1964) in the first instance and Joel Michell
and others thereafter. In a very recent article, "Measurement: A Beginner’s Guide",
Michell (2003) offered:
Some other theories, such as Rasch’s item response model (Rasch, 1960), are
amenable to the application of conjoint measurement. According to Rasch’s
model, the relationship between the probability of a person, i, performing
correctly on a unidimensional, dichotomous test item, j, P(χ2ij = 1); i’s level
of the relevant ability, ai,; and j’s level of difficulty, dj , is
P(χ2ij = 1) =
e(ai−dj)
1+ e(ai+dj) (1)
(where e is the base of the natural logarithm function). If (1) is true, then
P(χ2ij = 1) = f(ai − dj) (2)
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(f is an increasing monotonic function). That is, if Rasch’s theory is true,
then for any person, i, and item, j, of the relevant kind, the probability of i
getting j correct increases with the difference between i’s ability and j’s diffi-
culty. Proposition (2) implies that order relations between these probabilities
across persons and items must satisfy the hierarchy of conjoint measurement
cancellation conditions (Michell, 1990)."
(Michell, 2003, p.306)
While it can be readily demonstrated that the matrix of expected response pro-
babilities table derived from any set of Rasch item and person estimates will satisfy
those key measurement axioms, it is equally obvious that those axioms are routi-
nely violated in the 2-PL and 3-PL IRT models (Karabatsos, 1999a, b; 2000). It is the
so far unresolved challenge for Rasch measurement to demonstrate that the proce-
dures for determining whether the matrix of actual response frequencies adheres
sufficiently to the Rasch measurement prescriptions to satisfy the key conjoint mea-
surement axioms. If it is the case that the practice of Rasch measurement does not
yet satisfy this requirement, it might be allowed that this is because those interes-
ted in the development of the genuinely interval linear scale measures in the social
sciences have set their standards appropriately high.
Elsewhere, I have argued (Bond & Fox, 2001) that attention to stringent measu-
rement requirements in the social sciences goes hand-in-hand with attention to the
all-encompassing concept of construct validity as expounded by Samuel Messick
over the last decade. While Messick’s thesis is that his extended conception of cons-
truct validity is equally relevant to both quantitative and qualitative psychological
assessments, its use in the current context refers to those quantitative summaries
of assessments that we routinely call ’test scores’. Messick further asserted that,
"The extent to which score meaning and action implications hold across persons
or population groups and across settings or contexts is a persistent and perennial
empirical question."(1995, p.741)
Our attention to this aspect of construct validity, should derive, I contend, from
the principle of invariance of Rasch measures: estimates of item difficulty on the one
hand and estimates of person ability on the other. Given that Rasch measurement
instantiates interval level, rather than ratio level measurement, invariance of item
and person estimate values remains relative. Individual Rasch analyses (by default)
adopt the mean of the item difficulty estimates as the zero point on the calibration
scale, so it is the differences between item and person estimates, rather than those
estimates per se which should remain invariant across investigations.
It is a prima facie requirement of measurement outside the social sciences that
the values attributed to variables by any measurement system should be indepen-
dent of the particular measurement instrument used (as long as the instrument is
appropriate to the purpose). Moreover, the calibrations of the measurement ins-
trument should remain invariant across any of its intended purposes. Given our
relatively brief history of attempting genuine measurement in the human sciences,
it must be expected that our measurement attempts should fall somewhat short of
the physical sciences model. However, I would argue, only the fainthearted or those
with low expectations will yield to the obvious difficulties that must be overcome
if measurement rather than mere quantification is going to be the hallmark of our
research.
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An important goal of early research should be the establishment of item difficulty
values for important testing devices along with the anchoring of further investiga-
tions to the item values derived from that earlier research. It would be naïve however
to expect our early attempts will satisfy even the relative invariance principle on all
appropriate occasions. In the same way as the Inspector of Weights and Measu-
res would monitor the scales used by the local greengrocer, we would continually
monitor that the item values continued to behave as expected - within the error
of measurement. Where the invariance principle is not instantiated in practice we
would be motivated to examine the reason for that inadequate behavior and avoid
using any such item in its current form. "This is the main reason that validity is an
evolving property and validation is a continuing process." (Messick, 1995, p.741)
It would not be difficult to conclude that many users of the Rasch model are dri-
ven by the same sort of pragmatic considerations that guide model selection and
statistic choice elsewhere in psychometrics. In his reply to my review (Bond, 2001)
of his recent book, Michell (2001) asserted that such routine use of the Rasch model
with data would not qualify as scientific measurement. My own first use of Rasch
analysis was aimed at detecting whether two forms of assessment of cognitive de-
velopment did indeed locate performances at the same Piagetian stage, or whether
the high (Spearman’s ρ) correlation between those assessments indicated merely
similar ordinal relationships in the two datasets. I am now much more convinced
that measurement in the human sciences must be theoretically driven. In common
with the other quantitative rational sciences, we need theories of measurement of
human variables which satisfy the requirements for scientific measurement. On the
other hand, we need substantive theories about the human condition that allow us to
examine how the responses that candidates make to our data collection devices are
connected with the human attribute under investigation. While I might have been
fortunate to have Piaget’s 60 books and 600 articles on one side, and advice to use
the Rasch model to solve developmental measurement problems on the other, many
attempts at scale-building across the human sciences have a distinctly bottom-up
approach.
My co-author, Christine Fox, characterizes part of her research background as
that of an applied generalist. Much of her early work was spent providing psycho-
metrics advice to statisticians and researchers in disciplines such as health educa-
tion, counseling psychology, higher education, and early childhood, helping them to
choose, analyze, and interpret a variety of statistical analyses. (Bond & Fox, 2001,
p.xv) Her growing concern for the number of post hoc analyses she was obliged to
conduct on data derived from poorly conceptualized questionnaires prompted her
to adopt a new approach with faculty and students. She decided to ask them to
explicate a priori the expected difficulty relationships among the items themselves,
and between those items and the sorts of respondents for whom the data collection
device was devised. The pre-requisite requirement was: Are all these of the same
kind? i.e. are item and person performances indicative of the same underlying la-
tent trait? This involved the ordering of key items from ’requiring just a little of
this attribute’, through ’requiring more of this attribute’, to ’requiring a lot of this
attribute’. Then her consultancy required colleagues to identify hypothetical res-
pondents with various levels of the attribute under investigation, and to interpolate
those persons into the item ordering (with a basic Guttman - style pattern in mind).
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The theory - practice dialectic
Leading Rasch measurement proponent, Ben Wright, claimed that the relative ease
with which my students and I were able to develop sound scales of cognitive deve-
lopment at each attempt (e.g. Bond, 1995; Bond & Bunting, 1995; Bond 2001) was
due largely to the wealth of theoretical underpinning of the 60 years of the Piage-
tian oeuvre from which our scale-building attempts derived. Fox’s efforts with her
colleagues are designed to prompt them to make explicit the implicit theories that
they have about the way the human variables that concerns them are constructed,
and revealed, in a variety of human test performances; a beginning attempt at the
marriage of the theory of human measurement with a mini-theory about one human
variable. This is a far more circumspect claim than the one routinely made in psy-
chometrics. ". . . [P]sychologists have tended to overstate their achievements and
to lose sight of where they are as a quantitative science." (Michell, 2003, p.299)
Such nascent attempts at theory building are designed to take account of common
sources of invalidity following Messick: construct under representation and cons-
truct irrelevant variance are viewed as the two major threats to construct validity.
First, Fox’s advice provokes the colleague to consider the full extent of the variable,
from its ’barely detectable’ minimum to its ’off-the-scale’ maximum. Second, the or-
dering prediction helps the investigator to reflect on the Rasch output in terms of the
a priori statement of ordinal relationships; gaps in that correspondence might re-
veal levels of facility / difficulty that are unexpected in terms of the construct alone:
prima facie candidates for construct-irrelevant-difficulty and construct-irrelevant-
easiness. (Messick, 1995, p.742) Indeed, the Rasch /Messick link has been quite a
rich source of ideas for those interested in the validity / measurement nexus (e.g.
Fisher, 1994; Wilson, 1994). More recently, Smith (2001) discussed a raft of indi-
cators of reliability and internal consistency from Rasch analysis and linked them
quite directly to various aspects of Messick’s unified validity framework.
Rasch measurement theory in practice
If we were to take the example of the cognitive developmental test (BLOT) used to
outline Rasch measurement principles with dichotomous data in Chapter 4 of Bond
& Fox (2001), we might realize more readily how aspects of Rasch measurement
might inform those crucial validity issues.
Figure 1 (from Bond & Fox, 2001, p. 40) provides a convenient summary of item
statistics for the BLOT using a conception of the ’map’ format which is original
with that publication. On the vertical axis, the figure locates items according to item
difficulty, while the size of the item marker indicates the relative precision (standard
error) of that estimate. On the horizontal axis, the fit of those items is estimated in
a standardized form as a t distribution. Easier items are located at the bottom of
the pathway, with more difficult items at the top. Items which misfit the model are
located to the right; items which are closer to the deterministic, Guttman model are
located to the left. While the 35 BLOT items are spread across the difficulty scale
of about five logits, 30 of those items are compressed into a mere two logit space
around the mean of the item difficulty scale.
This item distribution, of course, has implications for the sorts of decisions we
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Figure 1. BLOT item difficulties (Bond & Fox, 2001)
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are entitled to make about the students who take this test. Messick implicates this
as one of the consequential aspects of validity. Decisions about students located at
the very high and very low ends of the BLOT scale would, necessarily, be based on
very small amounts of information derived from the three higher or two lower items.
Decisions made about students at the midpoint of the scale, where the BLOT test is
used to discern whether students are yet cognitively developed enough to benefit
from the less concrete teaching typical in secondary and tertiary institutions, should
be able to be made with a higher degree of confidence.
The fit indicators for the BLOT test revealed that two, perhaps three, items beha-
ved more erratically than expected. The prima facie evidence suggests that counts
for items 21 and 28 should not be routinely included in student BLOT measures
without further reflection. Rasch measurement requires us to distinguish between
counts (routinely summed raw scores on a test) and measures (linear interval mea-
sures based on the appropriate use of Rasch analysis) (Smith, 2001).
It almost goes without saying that the key Genevan text on the development of
formal operational thinking (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958) contains very little informa-
tion directly interpretable by a psychometrician about the relative difficulties of the
logical operations identified as crucial to mature adolescent thought. Strikingly,
those few indications that were made are nicely corroborated on the item difficulty
map by the correspondences between logical pairs of items (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958,
pp.293ff.) and Piaget’s claims about excluding and testing false implications (Inhel-
der & Piaget, 1958, p.75) (see Bond, 1989). This sort of theory / practice evidence
goes to the very heart of the issue of construct validity.
The more routinely used version of the variable map or Wright map from Rasch
measurement (Figure 2), has the distinct benefit of aligning person performances
as well as item performances on the same interval scale. The item-person map
summarizing the performance of 150 English secondary school children on the BLOT
test (Bond & Fox, 2001, p.42) confirms that many of these 14 year-olds are already
beyond the upper limit of the test. In the BLOT test’s usual role as a screening device
to identify concrete operational as opposed to a formal operational thinkers, this is
of little direct consequence.
However, the use of the BLOT test to measure changes in cognitive development
over time (e.g. Endler & Bond, 2001) would be hampered significantly by this obvious
ceiling effect. It reasonably might be contended that construct under representation
would be unlikely in the BLOT; the item specifications were drawn from each and
every descriptor found in the source text. The Rasch measurement evidence su-
ggests, however, that the extent or range of formal operational thinking ability is
under-represented. The most cogent critique of this shortcoming of the BLOT co-
mes from my colleague Richard Meinhard who argues that Piaget was a ’systems
theorist’. Meinhard always looks for evidence of the appropriate cognitive system
at work in children’s problem solving, and he contends that the mere sum of the
individual system components is only a small part of the evidence of an interactive
system at work.
So, at the more general level, Rasch measurement informs the quest for validity
in future development of the BLOT test by pointing to the area requiring further
items. At the more particular level, it behoves us to take the Rasch item difficulty
information into consideration when item distractors are constructed. At present,
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
BLOT Person Ability Estimates      BLOT Item Difficulty Estimates 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
  4.0                            | 
               XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX   | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                      XXXXXXXX   | 
                                 | 
  3.0                            | 
                                 | 
                       XXXXXXX   | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
           XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX   |      21 
                                 | 
                        XXXXXX   | 
  2.0                            | 
                       XXXXXXX   | 
                                 | 
                         XXXXX   |      28 
                     XXXXXXXXX   | 
                                 | 
                  XXXXXXXXXXXX   |      32 
                   XXXXXXXXXXX   |      30 
  1.0                    XXXXX   |      13     15 
                      XXXXXXXX   |       8     26 
                                 |       3 
                           XXX   |      25 
                           XXX   |      17     19 
                      XXXXXXXX   |      23 
                        XXXXXX   |       9     11     24     31 
   .0                       XX   |       4 
                            XX   |      18 
                             X   |      10 
                             X   |      16     35 
                             X   |      29     34 
                             X   |       7     33 
                           XXX   |       1      2     14 
                                 |      20 
 -1.0                        X   |       5     27 
                             X   |      22 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                             X   | 
                                 | 
                                 |      12 
                                 | 
 -2.0                            | 
                             X   | 
                                 | 
                                 |       6 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
 -3.0                            | 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Each X represents    1 student 
 
Figure 2. 2 Item-person (Wright) map - BLOT
Validity and assessment: a Rasch measurement perspective 187
the item distractors are other (incorrect) logical operations. In the future, the set
of distractors for any one item could be constructed with an eye to their difficulty
relative to that of the correct operational solution.
Rasch measurement indicators of item order and item fit then provide direct evi-
dence about of the validity of the testing procedure, especially when the test content
is explicitly embedded in substantive theory concerning the construct under inves-
tigation. And person ability and person fit indicators should be the subject of com-
plementary considerations about the validity of person performance expectations
derived from the construct.
Person and Item Invariance
While we can easily see that the group of persons who took the test are a sample
of the population of all possible test candidates, we less readily realize that the
test items themselves are merely a sample of all possible test items. This is due,
in no small part, to the relative ease of capturing a new sample of suitable test
candidates and the relatively difficulty of constructing a new sample of suitable test
items. In Rasch measurement, the principles and logic of analysis and interpretation
for persons completely mirrors that for items. We have a constant reminder of
the sample / population relationship for both items and persons, even though any
sample’s representativeness of the population is far less crucial.
The feature of parameter separation (Bond & Fox, 2001, pp.202-203; Smith, 2001)
focuses on the property of the Rasch model that supports direct comparisons of
person ability and item difficulty estimates, i.e. independently of the distribution of
those abilities and difficulties in the particular samples of persons and items under
examination. Ben Wright’s challenge to those claiming to have a good test was fort-
hright: divide your sample of persons in two according to ability and conduct item
estimations for each half of the sample in turn; the relative difficulties of the items
should remain stable across the two substantially different sub-samples. The coro-
llary is also true: relative person ability estimates should remain invariant regardless
of which half of the sample test items is used for the person estimation.
Figure 3 then, represents the results of my finally taking up Wright’s challenge -
rather than merely mouthing it and passing it on to others. I took the data from the
150 students who took the BLOT and divided them into two sub-samples: those with
scores of 27-35 and the rest (i.e. raw scores 5-26). Each subsample was analysed
separately and the 35 item estimates (and SEs) for each group were imported into
an Excel spreadsheet (Bond & Fox, 2001, pp.62-65). The plot of item values show
that, with the notable exception of item #21, the item estimates of the BLOT items
are invariant (within error); the dotted line is not a regression line, but the Rasch
modelled relationship required for invariance (the 95% control lines are based on
the SEs for each of the item pairs).
Now, item 21 is, by far, the most difficult BLOT item (Figs 1 & 2) and while the
high ability subsample allows us to gauge the difficulty difference between items 21
and 28 quite well, it is out of the range of the BLOT abilities shown by the low ability
half of the sample. This results in the 21 - 28 interval being underestimated with the
low ability group. Given that 26/35 has been estimated as the bound between con-
crete operational and formal operational performance on the BLOT, the invariance
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of the item estimates (within error) helps affirm the integrity of the BLOT under
Rasch procedures and demonstrates that the BLOT Rasch interval-scale maintains
its properties across quite disparate sub-samples.
 
Common Item Equating BLOT
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
BLOT Item Ests (High Ability)
Figure 3. Item Difficulty Invariance - Bond’s Logical Operations Test
Towards equated universal measures
Along with a case built on face validity, concurrent validity has often been regarded
as the sine qua non of validity evidence. Under True Score Theory, this evidence has
usually been provided in terms of correlational evidence: a calculation of Pearson’s r
or some form of factor analysis. In my early research years I often wondered about
the reason for producing highly correlated tests. Unless the new test had some
distinct benefit over the accepted standard in the field (e.g. faster, cheaper, ease
of administration or marking), it seemed to me that the aim should be to produce
a new test that was moderately related (prestige by association) but not so highly
correlated that it could be regarded as redundant. But then, I could hardly have
imagined hundreds of candidates sitting in front of computer screens all taking
different versions of the same test: Computer Adaptive Testing, where the items
chosen are dependent on the candidate’s responses and the estimate of ability is
required to be invariant across the particular sample of items delivered.
Moreover, we should expect that when one latent trait or underlying construct is
the subject of a variety of tests, person measures should remain invariant (within
error) across those testing conditions. The long-term aim of a genuine measure-
ment system in the human sciences should be access to a series of co-calibrated
testing situations, such that the raw score or locally calculated person measure co-
uld be expressed on the single scale used world-wide. A reasonable analogy from
the physical sciences might be drawn from thermometry. Thermometers are used
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to estimate temperature indirectly, by observation of the effect on some testing va-
riable: the length of an enclosed column of coloured alcohol, the resistance of a
metal wire, the straightening of a bi-metallic strip etc. The units on temperature are
not additive in the physical sense (as are weight and length), and almost as many
types of thermometer exist as there are temperatures to estimate. No one thermo-
meter is useful for more than a few selective applications, and none measures over
the full range of the temperature variable. Certainly, none does so without error.
Even notwithstanding one major country’s reluctance to use the international units
of temperature measurement, translations from °F to °C are routine and - with the
’buyer beware’ credo, "You get what you pay for!" in mind - temperatures are inter-
nationally measured, understood and compared after the most elementary sort of
training in ’test administration’.
One object of Fisher’s research (Fisher, 2000) is the establishment of what he
terms ’universal metrics’ for important aspects of human capital. His early attempts
at equating rehabilitation scales (e.g. Fisher, Eubanks & Marier, 1997) revealed the
remarkable utility of the Rasch model in supporting the co-calibration of instru-
ments across samples, in spite of differences in number of items, as well as in the
number and labels for Likert-scale options. Tesio and colleagues collaborated across
national boundaries (between Italy and the USA) and equated Rasch rehabilitation
measures on the FIMTM to reveal that variations in a few difficulty locations reflec-
ted differences between an incentive-driven medical system in the US and a more
family-based support system in Italy (Tesio, Granger, Perucca, Franchignoni, Batta-
glia & Russell, 2002). Smith (2001) summarised the basic steps for co-calibration of
test instruments while the key aspect of the conceptual basis for these procedures
presented in Bond & Fox (2001), relies on earlier expositions (Wright & Stone, 1979;
Masters, 1985; Masters & Beswick, 1986).
Common-person equating of two instruments involves a basic test of the inva-
riance of person ability estimates of a single sample across the two testing situations.
The two ability estimates for each person are plotted against each other; Rasch mea-
surement prescribes that the plots should fall on a single line (with allowance made
for the modelled SE pairs for each person locations). The converse case of common-
test equating assesses the invariance of item estimates across two samples given the
same test. Given that the Rasch model is quite robust in the face of missing data,
comparative estimates can be made even for those persons who did not respond to
all items, as well as for items attempted by only some of the respondents. (Chapter
5 of Bond & Fox (2001) provides details of a simple Excel spreadsheet to plot the
estimates and associated Standard Errors.) To the extent that the Rasch model’s
requirements for measurement are satisfied, the relative abilities of two samples
of persons on the two tests can be compared directly. When estimates on two re-
markably different tests of formal operational ability were compared (for the N=150
sample above), the results showed the two tests to measure the same dimension,
but that the PRTIII was much more difficult for high school students than was the
BLOT (Bond, 1995).
The principle underlying the plots of person and item invariance across testing
situations is exactly that underlying the detection of Differential Item Functioning
(DIF). When an item’s difficulty estimate location varies across samples by more than
the modelled error, then prima facie evidence of DIF exists. Indeed, Scheuneman &
Subhiyah (1998) from the National Board of Medical Examiners used merely an item
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estimate difference greater than 0.5 logits as the criterion for detecting DIF in a 250
item medical certification test given to over 400 candidates. Given that SE estimates
are inversely proportional to sample size, we could safely expect that a difference of
0.5 logit might have both statistical and substantive meaning (i.e. a genuine measu-
red difference) on this high-stakes test. Their very basic approach, based on the vio-
lation of the Rasch model’s expectation of estimate invariance, detected about 80%
of the items uncovered by the Mantel-Haenszel procedure. Moreover, they argued,
when the examiner understands the substantive construct under examination, and is
thereby able to posit reasonable hypotheses about the performances of sub-samples
of examinees, Rasch based indications of DIF are more directly comprehensible in
terms of those group differences.
When we recall that the procedures for item and person estimation are mirro-
red, we must then also countenance the complementary situation of Differential
Person Functioning: the examinee who performs differentially on two tests of the
latent trait delivered in different contexts. Part of Bunting’s research not reported in
Bond & Bunting (1995) involved the equating of students’ results derived from the
individually delivered Piagetian interview of the pendulum task (Bond & Fox, 2001,
Chapter 7) with those from the PRTIII - a demonstrated class-task of the same pro-
blem (Bond & Fox, 2001, Chapter 5). While the common person equating procedure
did not disconfirm the presence of a single underlying construct, two sets of results
were noteworthy, especially in terms of reflecting on the underlying developmen-
tal theory. First, the individual Piagetian interview version of the pendulum task
was, on average about 2 logits easier for the sample than was the pencil and paper
demonstrated class-task PRTIII - almost exactly the same difference and direction
for the BLOT v. PRTIII comparison reported earlier (Bond, 1995; Bond & Fox, 2001,
Chapter 5). Second, two of the DIF results highlight the complexities of measuring
and understanding the complexities of the human condition. A male student, descri-
bed by his teacher as coming from a male-dominated military family, scored much
better on the PRTIII administered in the class setting by (older, male) Bond than he
did in the individual Piagetian interview administered by (younger, female) Bunting.
A female student performed much better in the individual Piagetian interview with
Bunting than she did in the class group test where she seemed more focussed on her
young male peer sitting (very closely) beside her. And, what is more, the person fit
statistics in all four instances were quite unremarkable (Bunting, 1993). Now, reflect
on that little theory / practice in context dialogue.
And, of course, while the many-facets Rasch model can be used to measure the
systematic severity / leniency of judges (raters), Differential Rater Functioning would
alert us to the presence of rater bias - the rater who (un)wittingly changes severity
according some group characteristic. How is the theory of construct / context / rater
going to deal with that sort of evidence?
Objective Standard Setting
If, at this point, the Rasch model sets the standard for measurement in the human
sciences, then surely the methods for setting pass marks or cut-scores for quali-
fication examinations should reflect similar use of scientific approaches. Glass’s
scathing summary of the state of the cut-off or standard-setting art quarter of a
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century ago seems to have garnered very little that could be regarded as progress
since then. Glass argued that criterion-referenced standard setting approaches were
merely a "psuedoquantification, a meaningless application of numbers to a question
not prepared for quantitative analysis" (Glass, 1978, p.238). This sounds remarka-
bly reminiscent of the scientific measurement lobby’s critique of psychometrics in
general (see Bond & Fox 2001; Michell, 1999). While the modified Angoff method
seems to be the front-runner from the position of True Score Theory and IRT, the
chief current proponent of the Objective Standards Setting approach both ably ar-
gues and successfully demonstrates the superiority of the latter approach over the
former (Stone, 2001). Indeed, when the validity of standard setting is the key re-
quired outcome, then the OSS seems to have all the bases covered. The first steps
towards this Rasch-based procedure were outlined in a public forum by Wright &
Grosse (1993). Now, the cut-score is calculated by a series of logical steps developed
by Stone for a series of consultancies to examining boards (Stone, 2002) and profes-
sional expositions (Stone, 2001), to include those abilities (items) deemed essential
by the judges.
1 Judges use their expert judgement qualitatively to select their ’essential to
qualify’ items from all those on a Rasch-calibrated test.
2 The summary of each judge’s selected items is quantified by calculating the
mean item difficulty of those selected items.
3 The level of mastery required by the judges is expressed as a probability (e.g.
50%; 80% etc.) and converted to a logit measure by the usual odds to logits
transformation (e.g. 60% = +.41 logits etc.)
4 As each person estimate has an associated SE, the judges must consider what to
do when the error band of the candidate overlaps the cut score (so far calcula-
ted). Increasing the cut score by an error margin protects the public against
an inadequate practitioner, while decreasing that score by an error margin
protects the innocent examinee against the error-prone nature of testing and
evaluation.
Benefiting from the iterative nature of Rasch intervals, the final cut-point for
Objective Standard Setting is expressed as the sum of its component parts:
(Quantified Selected Content + Mastery Level) ± Confidence Level = Final Standard
The most convincing aspect of the OSS case as put by Stone (2001), is the com-
parison he made of passing rates on more than a dozen high-stakes certification
examinations over three years: the stability of the OSS pass-rates was in sharp con-
trast to the relative instability under the modified Angoff procedure.
Objective Standard Setting then capitalizes on the two key attributes of a scientific
measurement system in the human sciences: the validity of the test being used and
the Rasch measurement properties of the resultant scale. And the consequence
should be quite clear: unambiguous quantification of the qualitative evaluations
made by certifying or standards setting boards about the competencies displayed
by examinees on the qualifying exam. Setting a qualifying standard by adopting the
OSS principles outlined above (and in more detail in Stone, 2001) provides a level of
guarantee about examinee ability in relation to the standard not countenanced under
the "70% is a pass" conclusion derived by any lesser standard setting technique.
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Conclusion
Messick reminded us that "validation is empirical evaluation of the meaning and
consequences of measurement" (1995, p.747, emphasis added). This paper willin-
gly accepts Michell’s (1999) critique that psychometricians have overlooked (either
wilfully or otherwise) the requirements of what measurement should look like in a
rational quantitative human science. Indeed, Michell (1997; 2000) argued that psy-
chology’s persistent resistance to that critique seemed pathological; symptomatic of
a disorder. Then it asserts that, in practical terms, the Rasch model provides prac-
titioners with the most amenable practical guide to what scientific measurement
should be like in the human sciences. The possible shortcoming of this approach
in current practice is likely to be in the ability of misfit statistics to reveal where
data from practice does not satisfy the measurement axioms derived from Luce et
al. Moreover, it is argued that the invariance of item and person estimates across
measurement contexts addresses the very essence of validity in the human sciences.
The Rasch measurement approach to the construction and monitoring of variable
is so amenable to the issues raised in Messick’s broader conception of construct va-
lidity that Smith (2001) draws direct one-to-one correspondences between the eight
facets of construct validity from Messick (1995) and inferences drawn directly from
the theory and practice of Rasch measurement. The theory / practice dialectic (Bond
& Fox, 2001) ensures that validity is foremost in the mind of those developing mea-
sures and that genuine scientific measurement is foremost in the minds of those who
seek valid outcomes from assessment. Failures of invariance, such as those referred
to as DIF, alert us to the need to modify our assessment procedures or our substan-
tive theory about the human condition, or both. In Objective Standard Setting, Stone
(2001) demonstrated how valid pass-fail judgements reflect both on the conception
of the underlying latent trait and the transparent measurement procedures by which
experts evaluations are transformed to performance standards.
Rasch measurement instantiates an approach to assessment which can be descri-
bed, borrowing Messick’s own words, as a "comprehensive view of validity [which]
integrates considerations of content, criteria, and consequences into a construct fra-
mework for empirically testing rational hypotheses about score meaning and utility."
(Messick, 1995, p.742)
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